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COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT AND TERRORISM
I.

Introduction and Summary of Conclusions1

A. Issues
This memorandum addresses the elements of the crimes of Collective Punishment
and Terrorism, as defined in the Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone. Both of
these crimes were prohibited in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and further
prohibited according to Protocol II, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts. The first part of this memorandum will discuss the origins and development of
the crime of Collective Punishment, concluding with its current status as a war crime
today. The second part of this memorandum will discuss Terrorism as a war crime
focusing on what Terrorism means in this context.

B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Collective Punishment Involves Reprisals and any Punishment of
Persons Without a Proper Trial
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibits “the passing of sentences and
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as

1

ISSUE: According to the Special Court Statute, what are the elements of the following
crimes: a) Collective Punishment; (Art. 3b) b) Terrorism; (Art. 3d)

indispensable by civilized peoples.”2 The crime of Collective Punishment encompasses
situations where a group of people is “punished” in any way without a proper trial. The
International Community has recognized the importance of individual responsibility as
opposed to punishment for a crime that a person is not individually and directly
responsible for. Collective Punishment encompasses all situations where a group is
punished for the actions of one or some, but not necessarily all.
When the makers of the Geneva Convention added this provision, they had in
mind the reprisals of World War II. Reprisals are a form of collective punishment, in that
it is retaliatory action for any act against a group. Reprisals often take on a much greater
affect then the original action was, and most often affect large groups of people, most
likely innocent civilians. The International community recognizes the importance of only
using proper retaliatory methods, which meet the criteria of reasonability, proportionality,
and relation to the original violation.

2. Terrorism Does not Have an Explicit Definition in the World
Community, but During War, Encompasses the Majority of War
Crimes When Committed against the Civilian Population
Terrorism is becoming an increasingly disturbing method that groups are using in
war. The International Community has yet to develop a universally acceptable distinct
definition of what is encompassed within the crime of Terrorism; however, actions that
have been described as Terrorist actions include violent actions committed against
civilians in a time of war, and include a mens rea focusing on the desire to impose mass

2

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 3 (1) (d), 12
August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab3.]

2

fear, or a desire to force a nation or group of people to comply with the political goals of
the terrorist group.
With respect to Terrorism during war, the term is even less often described, and
only recently has the International community recognized the fact that terrorism can in
fact occur during war. Because of this, whether something is merely an act of war, or an
act of terrorism is often blurred. The International Community has recognized that
certain actions are not a part of the customary perceptions of what is and what is not
proper actions during wartime. The International Community recognizes that crimes
such as Genocide and mass killings of civilians are not proper acts of war, but are rather
criminal acts of Terrorism. Most war crimes, including Collective Punishment and
reprisals, can fall under the umbrella of Terrorism when they are committed with the
intent to impose fear or to coerce a group or government.

II.

Factual Background
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, unlike other ad hoc courts such as the

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) is a joint venture as part of an
agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone.3 The court sits outside of the
United Nations Security Council, and prosecutes crimes committed in Sierra Leone after
November 30th, 1996.4

3

Special Court for Sierra Leone Handbook for Journalists, at http://www.scsl.org/handbookforjournalists.html. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 52.]

4

Id.

3

Among the crimes that the court prosecutes are Crimes against Humanity, War
Crimes, including Terrorism and Collective Punishment, and Certain crimes under Sierra
Leone law.5
In 1991, a Civil War began between the Sierra Leone government and the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF).6 During the 11 year war, nearly 200,000 people were
killed.7 Atrocities such as rape and dismemberment littered the conflict throughout the
entire war until a cease fire was called in 2002.8
13 defendants have been indicted thus far under the tribunal. Among those
indicted is Charles Taylor, who was the former President of Liberia.9 As President of
Liberia, Taylor helped to fund the RUF, which committed various war crimes and
atrocities on the people of Sierra Leone in exchange for “blood diamonds.”10 Taylor has
been charged with Terrorizing the Civilian Population and Collective Punishments,
Unlawful Killings, Sexual Violence, Physical Violence, Use of Child Soldiers,
Abductions and Forced L\abour, Looting and Burning, and Attacks on Unamsil
Personnel.11

5

Id.

6

The CIA World Factbook on Sierra Leone, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sl.html.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 48.]

7

S. Leone War Crime Court Opens, CNN, Mar. 10, 2004, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/03/10/sleone.tribunal. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebooks at Tab 51.]

8

Id.

9

Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebooks at Tab 32.]
10

S. Leone War Crime Court Opens, supra note 7. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 51.]

11

Charles Ghankay Taylor, supra note 9. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 32.]
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Among the others who have been indicted under the Tribunal was Foday Saybana
Sankoh12, who is the alleged leader of the Revolutionary United Front.13 Sankoh was
also accused of terrorizing the civilian population and collective punishments.14 Other
indictments involving terrorism and collective punishments against defendants include
Johnny Paul Koroma,15 Sam Bockarie,16 Issa Hassan Sesay,17 Alex Tamba Brima,18
Morris Kallon,19 Sam Hinga Norman,20 Augustine Gbao,21 Brima Bazzy Kamara,22
Moinina Fofana,23 Allieu Kondewa,24 and Santigie Borbor Kanu.25

12

Saybana Kankoh recently died while in custody.

13

Prosecutor v. Foday Saybana Sankoh, Case No. SCSL-2003-02. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebooks at Tab 29.]

14

Id.

15

Prosecutor v. Johnny Paul Koroma, Case No. SCSL-2003-03. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebooks at Tab 20.]

16

Prosecutor v. Sam Bockarie, Case No. SCSL-2003-04. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at
Tab 17.]

17

Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay et. al., Case No. SCSL-2004-15-PT. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebooks at Tab 30.]

18

Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima et. al., Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 18.]

19

Issa Hassan Sesay et. al., supra note 17. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 30.]

20

Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman et. al., Case No. SCSL-2004-14-PT. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebooks at Tab 25.]

21

Issa Hassan Sesay et. al, supra note 17. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 30.]

22

Alex Tamba Brima et. al., supra note 18. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 18.]

23

Samuel Hinga Norman et. al., supra note 20. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 25.]

24

Id.

25

Alex Tamba Brima et. al., supra note 18. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 18.]

5

III. Legal Discussion
A. Collective Punishment
1. Introduction
This section will discuss the history and current implications of the crime of
collective punishment. It will begin by discussing the Reprisal Killings that were
prevalent during World War I and World War II, which lead to the recognition of
collective punishment as a war crime. Next, it evaluates the text in the Geneva
Convention of August 12, 1949, and the legislative history behind adding collective
punishment to the Convention. Finally, this section will review some of the situations
and case law where actions alleged to be collective punishment were called into question.
The Special Court of Sierra Leone makes collective punishment a crime under the
definition set forth in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.26 Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention defines Collective Punishment by stating “in the case of armed conflict not of
an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions.”27
Provision (1) states
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention. Or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without adverse distinction founded

26

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.html.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 7.]

27

Geneva Convention, supra note 2 at Art. 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 3.]
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on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other
criteria.28
With respect to these provisions, the Article lists four acts which are prohibited,
including “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all of the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”29
Collective punishment, or reprisal punishment “indiscriminately punish[es]
persons on a collective basis.”30 Collective punishment is not accepted in that the victims
of reprisals are not states, but are rather protected persons and targets “who unduly suffer
from the consequences of a belligerent state’s breach of its international obligations.”31

2. Reprisal Killings of World War I and World War II
When the drafters of the Geneva Convention envisioned making Collective
Punishment a crime, they had in mind the Reprisal Killings of World War I and World
War II.32 “Reprisals are retributive practices which are recognized in the context of the
international regulation of armed conflicts.”33
The notion that collective punishment and reprisals are wrong reaches back to
1907. Article 50 of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
28

Id at Art. 3(1).

29

Id. at Art. 3(1)(d).

30

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 447 (1992).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 35.]

31

Id. at 448.

32

Daoud Kuttab, Collective Punishment, CRIMES OF WAR, available at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/collective-punishment.html. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebooks at Tab 49.]
33

BASSIOUNI, supra note 30, at 447. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 35.]

7

Land states, “no general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the
population on account of the acts of individuals for which they can not be regarded as
jointly and severally responsible.”34 As will be seen below, this notion has been
continually abused.35

a. World War I
After the 1907 Hague Convention, reprisals became the preferred method by
which to compel “belligerent enem[ies] who violated norms and standards of the
regulation of armed conflicts to comply with them.”36 Retaliation was used as an excuse
to override the notion that collective punishment is not a proper tool to use in war.
Reprisals were not sparse, but were a common tool used liberally by both parties
throughout World War I.37
German military commanders used collective punishment methods creatively
throughout World War I, recounting them as reprisals to those who questioned the
tactics.38 J.W. Garner, writing during World War I, recounts many of the atrocities that
the Germans employed:
They have consisted of pecuniary fines, either direct or under the
guise of contributions, the seizure and shooting of hostages, the
34

Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Art. 50 (1907), reprinted in THE
HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 (James Brown Scott, ed. 1915). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 4.]
35

See, e.g. J.W. Garner, Community Fines and Collective Responsibility, 11 AJIL 511 (1917) (discussing
the collective responsibility atrocities of World War I. Garner related the fact that both parties took
advantage of what they called reprisals, when in fact, the actions that they were engaged in amounted to
excessive collective punishment.). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 44.]

36

BASSOUINI, supra note 30 at 447. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 35.]

37

Id. at 452.

38

Garner, supra note 35 at 511. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 44.]
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burning of towns and villages, the destruction of private houses,
the deportation of the civil population, the commercial isolation of
refractory towns, the interdiction of public charitable relief to the
unemployed, the confinement of the inhabitants within doors for
certain periods, and the like.39

Specific instances were extreme, and punished large groups of people for the
actions of one or several. In one instance, a city was fined 5,000,000 francs when a
policeman attacked a German officer in a dispute between the two people.40 This dispute
arose when the Germans were trying to ban certain newspapers from being circulated.41
These events continued throughout the war whenever opposition to the Germans was
shown.42
Even after the end of fighting in World War I, collective punishment was still
readily employed. After the war, the Saar was separated from Germany under a mandate
from the League of Nations.43 This has been considered by some a form of collective
punishment since the inhabitants did not agree to the separation, nor were they given any
opinion in the matter.44
Proponents of reprisals attempted to use them as an excuse, dismissing them as
merely retaliatory, and therefore justified against the actions of enemy actions.45 The fact

39

Id. at 511.

40

Id. at 515.

41

Id. at 516.

42

See, generally, Id. (describing numerous instances of collective punishment employed by the German
forces throughout World War I).
43

NINA H. B. JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 168 (2000).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 38.]
44

Id.

45

BASSIOUINI, supra note 30 at 448. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 35.]
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remains, however, that the reprisals took on the characteristic of collective punishment.
The reprisals were often against victims who were not individually responsible for the
actions which were being retaliated against.46 In addition, the reprisals were often much
more harsh then the original actions which induced the reprisals.47
As a result, after World War I, there was a movement to stop disproportional
retribution. Likewise, “[r]easonableness, proportionality and counter-part of violations
were…three essential elements which the post-World War I developments produced.”48
To be considered legal in a war setting, any retaliatory actions needed to fulfill those
elements.

b. World War II
Although the law disfavored reprisals after World War I, the law was still
uncertain.49 Reprisals were used on a large-scale during World War II.50 When the
writers of the Geneva Convention were in the drafting stages, collective punishment was
added as an offense because of the great number of reprisals employed during World War
II.51

46

Id.

47

See, e.g. Garner, supra note 35 (discussing many of the collective punishment atrocities that took place
during World War I). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 44.]

48

BASSIOUINI, Supra note 30 at 447. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 35.]

49

See Id. at 452 (Discussing the evolution of law regarding reprisals between World War I and World War
II).

50

Id.

51

Geneva Convention, supra note 2. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 3.]
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At the Nuremberg Trials following World War II, the International community
took care to make it known that reprisals were not a proper act in wartime, and defined
the term “reprisal” very broadly. The concept was defined when the Tribunal stated
“[t]he idea that an innocent person may be killed for the criminal act of another is
abhorrent to every natural law. We condemn this injustice of any such rule as a relic of
ancient times.”52 The Tribunal continued to conclude, “[t]he occupant may properly
insist upon compliance with regulations necessary to the security of occupying forces and
for the maintenance of law and order. In accomplishment of this objective, the occupant
may, only as a last resort, take and execute hostages.”53
There were numerous atrocities committed during World War II which violated
the International belief that reprisals were wrong.54 These atrocities often occurred on
both sides of the war, the Germans and the allies.55 Among the atrocities were numerous
indiscriminate bombings of civilian population.56
The Germans, as well as the other parties involved in the war initially viewed
reprisals as a defense.57 It was raised as a defense since they often used the excuse that
an atrocity was committed against them before taking the actions against the enemy.
52

PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR 171 (2000). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 39.]

53

Id.

54

BASSIOUNI, supra note 35 at 455. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebooks at Tab 35.]

55

Id at 452-53.

56

Id. at 454. For example, in September 1940, the German Luftwaffe accidentally bombed London. As a
reprisal, England bombed Berlin. “Germany responded by excessive bombing of London and other cities
of England,” explaining that they were legitimate reprisals. The Allies responded once again, bombing the
city of Dresden until it lay desolate. There were 30,000 to 100,000 casualties in the city of Dresden alone.
This is one example of the numerous bombings and atrocities that occurred as the result of one accidental
bombing. Id.

57

Id. at 453.
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However, in most cases, these reprisals were not a justified reciprocal action. They were
not committed directly against the enemy that might have attacked first, and were rather
committed against the civilian populations of enemy nations.58
After World War II, however, the International community began to look at the
reprisals not as a suitable defense, but rather as a war crime in themselves.59 The Chief
U.S. Prosecutor at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson, argued that even if it could be a defense
against war crimes or crimes against peace, it could not be a defense against crimes
against humanity.60
One of the elements of reprisals as a defense is that the action had to be against
belligerents, not a state’s own citizens. Therefore, when collective punishment is
committed against a state’s own citizens, it cannot be claimed as reprisals in a defense.61
The United States held trials for many of the war criminals from World War II
under Control Council Law #10. Control Council Law #10 was established to “establish
a uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar
offenders, other than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal.”62 The
Control Council prosecuted criminals for many crimes including those which would fall
into the category of collective punishment.
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Among the atrocities that were committed, “[w]hen attacks by lawfully
constituted enemy military forces, and attacks by unknown persons, against German
troops and institutions took place, these persons were, without benefit of investigation or
trial, summarily hanged or shot.”63 Other atrocities included “thousands of
noncombatants, arbitrarily designated as ‘partisans,’ ‘Communists,’ ‘Communist
suspects,’ ‘bandits,’ and ‘bandit suspects,’ also without benefit of investigation or trial,
were terrorized, tortured, and murdered, in retaliation for attacks by lawfully constituted
enemy military forces and attacks by unknown persons against German troops and
installations.”64

3. Collective Punishment and the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949
After the conclusion of a diplomatic conference in Geneva in 1949, the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims was developed.
Further, in 1977, an additional protocol was developed for the protection of victims of
international armed conflicts,65 as well as a protocol for their protection during noninternational armed conflicts.66 The treaty and protocols became the most widely ratified
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treaties besides the Charter of the United Nations.67 They codified the notion that
collective punishment is not proper to invoke.
Collective punishment is prohibited under Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949, covering “Conflicts Not of an International Character.”68 That article
prohibits the act of “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.”69

a. “In the case of armed conflict”
The first part of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 starts out by stating:
“[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply,
as a minimum, the following provisions.”70
The issue of what a “case of armed conflict” actually constituted arose
continuously at the Diplomatic Conference that resulted in the composition of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.71 As feared by some delegates, the term “armed conflict” can be
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interpreted as a full war, or “if a handful of individuals were to rise in rebellion against
the state and attack a police station.”72 It was suggested, and the idea ultimately
abandoned, to create a list of situations that would define the term conflict.73
Although it was abandoned, in his authoritative Commentaries to the
Geneva Conventions, Jean Pictet set forth a list of conditions (although not obligatory)
which can “constitute convenient criteria:”74

1.

That the party in revolt against the de jure Government
possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible
for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having
the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the
convention.
2. That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the
regular military forces against insurgents organized as military
and in possession of a part of the national territory.
3. (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents
as belligerents; or
(b) That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or
(c) That it has accorded the insurgents recognition as
belligerents fro the purposes only of the present Convention;
or
(d) That the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the
Security Council or the General Assembly of the United
Nations as being a threat to international peace, a breach of
the peace, or an act of aggression.
4. (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have
the characteristics of a State.
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto
authority over persons within a determinate portion of the
national territory.
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of an
organized authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary
laws of war.
72
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(d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the
provisions of the Convention.75
This does not mean that armed conflict can only arise in situations which meet the
above criteria. Pictet does not list them as an exhausted list, and believes that the term
should have broad application.76

b. “each Party to the conflict”77
The Article states that the provisions apply to “each Party to the Conflict.”78 With
reference to parties in internal struggles, “[t]he mere fact of the legality of a Government
involved in an internal conflict suffices to bind that Government as a Contracting Party to
the Convention.”79 “The obligation is absolute for each of the Parties.”80
Doubt was expressed at the Diplomatic Conference when the Convention was
created as to whether or not insurgents could be “legally bound by a Convention which
they had not themselves signed.”81 Pictet writes, however, “if the responsible authority at
their head exercises effective sovereignty, it is bound by the very fact that it claims to
represent the country, or part of the country.”82
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The only way a party to an internal armed conflict to avoid being bound by
Article 3 is to follow the denunciation procedure that is outlined in Article 158.83
However, even to have this process be effective, the denouncing authority must be
“recognized internationally as a competent Government.”84

c. Subsection (d) of sub-paragraph (1): Sentences and Executions
Without a Proper Trial
Jean Pictet describes this section as meaning “[t]he taking of hostages, like
reprisals, to which it is often the prelude, is contrary to the modern idea of justice in that
it is based on the principle of collective responsibility for the crime. Both strike at
persons who are innocent of the crime which it is intended to prevent or punish.”85
All sentences must be imposed only after there is a proper trial because imposing
sentences without a trial is too erratic, in that there are many situations where a sentence
can be imposed upon an innocent person.86 Every civilized nation has an understanding
or a law stating that a trial is needed before a sentence, and “[t]he Convention has rightly
proclaimed that it is essential to do this even in time of war.”87 It is important to note that
this provision “leaves intact the right of the State to prosecute, sentence and punish
according to the law.”88
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Although reprisals are not explicitly prohibited in Article 3,89 as mentioned above,
that does not mean that they are permitted in cases of non-international conflict.90 Any
reprisal that encompasses any of the prohibited acts is not allowed under the Geneva
Convention.91 “Article 3 has an extremely wide field of application.”92 Atrocities such
as the taking of hostages and sentences and executions without a proper trial are
“prohibited absolutely and permanently, no exception or excuse being tolerated.”93

4. International Recognition of the Prohibition of Attacks on Civilians
As has been seen in previous sections, many of the atrocities committed as
collective punishment were committed against civilians.94 The addition of collective
punishment into the Fourth Geneva Convention is one step towards universal acceptance
of the fact that civilians cannot be indiscriminately punished for actions that they did not
necessarily engage in.
The International Court of Justice issued an Advisory Opinion in 1996 that
recognized and reiterated the contention that “deliberate attacks on Civilians or Civilian
objects are absolutely prohibited by international humanitarian law.”95 The Advisory
Opinion addressed the dangers in the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.96
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In that opinion, the ICJ wrote that there are “cardinal principals contained in the
texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law.”97 Among these cardinal principals is
“the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and [the] establish[ment]
[of] the distinction between combatants and non-combatants.”98
The ICJ, however, still recognizes that excessive force upon combatants is also a
cardinal principal of humanitarian law. “[I]t is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering
to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or
uselessly aggravating their suffering.”99
All of the reprisals and collective punishment atrocities that have been committed
against both civilians and the military caused excessive harm. It has become recognized
by the International community that these types of atrocities are not proper under the
rules of humanitarian law, even in times of war.

5. Cases Related to Collective Punishment

a. USA v. Pohl et. al. (World War II Control Council Law # 10 Case)
After World War II, some of the war criminals were prosecuted under the World
War II Control Council,100 which defined and prohibited war crimes and crimes against
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humanity. Among those cases were USA v. Pohl et. al.,101 which indicted Oswald Pohl
and others for crimes committed during World War II.
Among the crimes which the defendants were indicted for were a common design
or conspiracy “to establish, maintain, operate, and administer throughout Germany and
other countries concentration camps and labor camps in which thousands of persons,
including prisoners of war, German civilians, and nationals of other countries, were
unlawfully imprisoned, enslaved, tortured, and murdered.102
They were further indicted on War Crimes. Among the way that the war crimes
were carried out were through concentration camps.103 With the respect to the
concentration camps, they were charged with “their operation, maintenance, and
administration and the establishment of new concentration camps.”104 They were further
charged with being “responsible for the food, clothing, housing, sanitation, and medical
care of the inmates; for the order, regulations, and discipline their lives; and had the
power to exact the death penalty for infraction of its rules.”105
As for how the inmates were treated, the defendants were charged with crimes
with respect to the punishments inflicted on the concentration camp inmates. “The
murders, torture, and ill-treatment charged were carried out by the defendants with
diverse methods, including gassing, shooting, hanging, whipping, beating, gross
101
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overcrowding, systematic imposition of labor tasks beyond the strength of those ordered
to carry them out.”106
“The defendants assisted in planning and carrying out plans for the subjugation
and extermination of entire “races” and nationalities considered inferior by the Nazi
hierarchy.”107 The defendants had no reason other than following the Nazi belief that
these nationalities and races were inferior for destroying these innocent people.
The prosecution described the crimes of the indictments as “man’s inhumanity to
man”108 The concentration camps were designed to provide “protective custody” for
people who were not legally sentenced to imprisonment.109 Theoretically, the Nazis were
not imposing life in a concentration camp as a punitive measure in that there was no
crime which those people were accused of.110 The only reason that people were placed in
the concentration camps is that they believed, or engaged in something that the Nazi’s
believed was “undesirable.”111
Some of the prisoners were accused of having “committed offenses against the
Reich or the German forces in occupied territories.”112 Bypassing the possibility of a
trial, these people were brought to the concentration camps, only if capital punishment
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could be carried out extremely quickly.113 If this was not possible, then they were turned
over to the Security Police, who promptly carried out a punishment, without contacting or
allowing the prisoner to contact their families.114
The prisoners brought to the concentration camps or executed directly were not
allowed to have a trial, nor were they allowed to testify to their innocence. However, the
defense in the Pohl case focused on the fact that the defendants were merely following
orders, and therefore should not be held responsible for their actions.115 In response to
the negative treatment of the prisoners while housed at the concentration camps, in
particular, the use of the inmates as slave labor, the defense was that they “were forced
only by the economic necessity of incorporating the labor inside the concentration camps
into the general mobilization and of employing them usefully and of excluding every
uneconomical utilization of labor as was in many instances the case in the camps up to
this time.”116

b. United States v. List et. al. (Control Council Law #10 Case)
One case that was tried following World War II was The Hostages Case.117 It was
tried at the United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg under the authority of Control
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Council Law #10. In that case, twelve German leaders were indicted for “offences
committed under their command of Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania and Norway, these
offences being mainly so-called reprisal killings, purportedly taken in an attempt to
maintain order in the occupied territories in the face of guerrilla opposition, or wanton
destruction of property not justified by military necessity.”118
During their reign over Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania, these leaders had
German troops murder thousands of civilians from Greece.119 There were two categories
of victims, including those that were put into prison camps, and those who were named as
partisans.120 All of these people were inhumanely murdered without a trial.121
The indictment stated that “these acts of collective punishment were part of a
deliberate scheme of terror and intimidation, wholly unwarranted and unjustified by
military necessity and in flagrant violation of the laws and customs of war.”122
The defense in that case argued that the taking of the persons without a trial were
in actuality taking hostages as a form of reprisal.123 The defense stated, “reprisals had to
be resorted to above all against illegal actions of the civilian population, in order to force
the latter to desist from its illegal conduct. It would be absurd to assume that the
commanders of the armed forces of a belligerent party had to endure acts of an enemy
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civilian population in violation of international law, without being able to protect their
troops, when necessary, by retaliatory measures.”124
The court took care to make a distinction between taking hostages and
reprisals.125 A hostage is the “holding of individuals to insure the future good conduct of
the other party,”126 and a reprisal is “holding or punishing individuals for past violations
or conduct.”127 The court determined that there was a misuse of the term hostages by the
defense, and that in the event hostages or reprisal prisoners are taken, there had to be a
public announcement of such, and each of the persons taken had to have a proper trial
before a punishment can be placed upon them.128
In addressing the fact that the International community had yet to determine a
sufficient definition and line of where a military leader can contemplate executing
prisoners or reprisal prisoners, the court determined that “[w]hat remains, of course, is the
rule at the root of the Tribunal’s reasoning, that ‘the lives of persons may not be
arbitrarily taken.’”129

c. USA. v. Von Leeb et al. (Control Council Law #10 Case)
In this case, known as the High Command case, Wilhelm Von Leeb and other
German officers were tried and convicted of a great number of atrocities committed
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against both soldiers and civilian citizens in Europe during World War II.130 The case
centers on orders given for war crimes. The counts included extreme retaliation against
civilians and soldiers for lawful military action against German troops.131
In one instance, 100 Serbs were ordered murdered in retaliation for the death of
one German soldier and the wounding of two other German soldiers.132 In another
instance, 200 Greek citizens and 100 “Communists” were executed for the death on one
German.133 Of the ten defendants in this case, two were acquitted, and eight received
sentences ranging from seven years to life imprisonment for their involvement in the
atrocities.134

d. The Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic and Others (ICTY Case)
This case was concerned with an attack on Ahmici on April 16, 1993, where the
subjects took part in “ethnic cleansing” on the Muslims as part of the Muslim-Croat
conflict.135 On that date, the defendants entered the city of Ahmici and expelled or killed
many of the Muslims.136 The Prosecutor argued that this event was an effort of the
Croats to create their own political state.137
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The defense argued differently, contending that it was in fact the Muslims that
were the aggressors and that they were merely retaliating for the attacks.138 Among other
reasons, the defense argued that the Muslims caused the attack when they erected
barricades which prevented the Bosnian-Croat forces from traveling to fight the Serbs.139
After small conflicts surrounding the city of Ahmici,140 the full attack occurred on
April 16, 1993. Witnesses observed the attacks and killings of many Muslims in the city
of Ahmici, whether or not they were directly involved in the original conflicts.141 The
bodies of 96 Muslim and 3 Croats were buried in a mass grave, with evidence the
majority died a violent death.142 Further, many of the Muslims were detained following
the conflict.143
Given the characteristics of the attack, the court addressed the applicable law with
respect to reprisals and the prohibitions of attacks on civilian populations.144 The court
reiterated that “it is now a universally recognized principle, recently restated by the
International Court of Justice, that deliberate attacks on Civilians or Civilian objects are
absolutely prohibited by international humanitarian law.145 There are only three instances
when the protection of civilians can be reduced: “(i) when civilians abuse their rights, (ii)
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when, although the object of a military attack is comprised of military objectives,
belligerents cannot avoid so-called collateral damage to civilians; and (iii) at least
according to some authorities, when civilians may legitimately be the object of
reprisals.”146
With specific reference to reprisals, the court indicated that “under customary
international law they are prohibited as long as civilians find themselves in the hands of
the adversary.”147 In referring to the attempt to claim reprisals as a legitimate method of
revenge, the court stated, “[I]t cannot be denied that reprisals against civilians are
inherently a barbarous means of seeking compliance with International Law.”148
Further employing the relationship between reprisals and collective punishment,
“the reprisal killing of innocent persons, more or less chosen at random, without any
requirement of guilt or any form of trial, can safely be characterized as a blatant
infringement of the most fundamental principles of human rights.”149
In supporting the claim that collective punishment, the court indicated that of the
numerous international and internal armed conflicts that had occurred over recent years,
states have typically refrained from claiming that they have a right to engage in random
reprisal activities.150
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The court concluded that the customary law, in cooperation with the 1949 Geneva
Convention which prohibits punishment to people without a fair trial supports the fact
that reprisal killings are not a legal right in warfare.151

e. The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Milorad Krnojelac (ICTY Case)
The case of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Milorad Krnojelac is another
example of collective punishment actions in the former Yugoslavia.152 During the war,
Krnojelac was the commander of the KP Dom, a detention camp.153 There, he was in a
position of authority over many others.154
The accusations of collective punishment come with the treatment of the
detainees being held in the detention camp. In the summer of 1993, one of the detainees
at the camp attempted to escape.155 As a result, all of the detainees at the camp were
punished. They were threatened with death if anyone tried to escape from the camp.156
Further, the food rations were decreased for all of the detainees for at least 10 days.157 10
of the detainees who had worked closely with the detainee who had attempted to escape
were beaten.158
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Krnojelac was found guilty of a crime against humanity (imprisonment and
inhumane acts), cruel treatment, and a violation of the laws or customs of war (living
conditions).159

B. Terrorism
1. Introduction
"The aim of terrorists may be to create chaos so that new repressive measures
introduced by the government will make the population inclined to revolutionary change
when the terrorist movement could become a guerilla movement.”160 The Statute for the
Special Court for Sierra Leone makes it a crime to commit acts of terrorism during times
of war according to Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the
protection of War Victims and of Additional Protocol II thereto of 9 June 1977.161
“[T]he international community has tried unsuccessfully to arrive at a common
definition of terrorism” for quite some time.162 Acts of Terrorism are prohibited in the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict.163 Acts of Terrorism are
prohibited under that the Additional Protocol when committed against “[a]ll persons who
do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take place in hostilities, whether or not
159
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their liberty has been restricted.”164 In other words, acts of terrorism cannot be
committed against civilians. Despite this contention, the conventions do not define what
terrorism is.

2. Definitions of Terrorism
Although terrorism is not explicitly defined in the Geneva Conventions, it is
explicitly prohibited. Commonly, terrorism hinges on the intent of the perpetrators and is
“predominantly exercised against random targets, often innocent civilians.”165 This
section will review some statutory definitions of terrorism, primarily in the context of
terrorism during armed conflict.

a. 1949 Geneva Conventions Article 33
The Geneva Conventions prohibits “all measures” of “terrorism” in Article 33.
Among the acts that were prohibited are “violence to life and person, cruel treatment,
torture, the taking of hostages, summary executions and other forms of murder or
punishment without judicial safeguards, outrages upon personal dignity, and humiliating
and degrading treatment.”166
The Geneva Convention further created a nonabsolute ban on forms of
coercion.167 This prohibition is very broad although the drafters ‘had mainly in mind
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coercion aimed at obtaining information, work or support for an ideological or political
idea.’”168 These acts are the main “means or strategies often employed by terrorists.”169
The two additional protocols that were introduced to supplement the 1949 Geneva
Convention included specific provisions which further created a ban on terrorism.170
They also prohibit “any other form of armed violence directed at the civilian population
as such.171 A 1972 draft prohibited “terrorist acts” and “acts of terrorism, as well as
reprisals against persons,” and a 1973 draft prohibited “acts and measures that spread
terror,” and “attacks that spread terror among the civilian population and are launched
without distinction against civilians and military objectives.”172 It further prohibited
“violent acts of terrorism perpetrated without distinction against civilians who do not take
a direct part in hostilities.”173 These provisions can serve to protect citizens even in
situations of armed conflict during war.174
The draft has been updated to further emphasize the fact that terrorism is
particularly disturbing when it is committed against the civilian population.175 The
changes are important because it can “help to implement customary and current
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expectations that attacks on the civil population as such should be prohibited,”176 in
contrast to conventions on war where they “primarily protect persons already in control
of the military force or in occupied territory and the wounded, infirm, women, children,
or ‘other persons’ who are ‘exposed to grave danger’.”177

b. The United States Government
The United States Government defines terrorism in the United States Criminal
Statute. Under that statute, International Terrorism is defined as activities that “involve
violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within
the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State.”178
The acts which would normally be considered criminal acts alone become
terrorist acts when they are intended “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,”179 “to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion,”180 or “to affect the
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping.”181 They are
acts of International Terrorism when they “occur primarily outside of the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means
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by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or
coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.”182
The statute also defines Domestic Terrorism as activities that “involve acts
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of
any state,”183 and “occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.”184
As with International Terrorism, whether an act is merely criminal or terrorism
turns on the mens rea of the perpetrator. To be determined to be Domestic Terrorism, the
intent must be “to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,”185 “to influence the policy
of a government by intimidation of coercion,”186, or “to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”187

c. International Definitions
As has been mentioned above, there are numerous different definitions for
Terrorism throughout the world.188 Among those definitions are those that have been
coined by individual countries as well as those that have been developed by International
organizations. This section will discuss some of those definitions.
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The United Nations General Assembly defined Terrorism in The Geneva
Declaration on Terrorism, passed on 29 May 1987.189 Stated in that declaration is that

“[t]errorism originates from the statist system of structural violence and
dominance that denies the right of self-determination to peoples; that
inflicts a gross and consistent pattern of violations of fundamental human
rights upon its own citizens; or that perpetrates military aggression and
overt or covert intervention directed against the territorial integrity or
political independence of other states.”190
The document also defines state terrorism, stating that it manifests itself in “police
state practices against its own people to dominate through fear of surveillance, disruption
of group meetings, control of the news media, beatings, torture, false and mass arrests,
false charges and rumors, show trials, killings, summary executions and capital
punishment.”191
The General Assembly adopted a Declaration on Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism in 1994.192 In the annex to that resolution, it stated
“criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the
general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political
purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the
considerations of political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.”193
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There have been many International treaties that have mentioned and dealt with
combating terrorism. The treaties are wide in scope, dealing with weapons (nuclear,
biological, chemical), aircraft hijacking, kidnapping, and other activities that are
considered terrorist acts.
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
makes it unlawful to finance any terrorist activities.194 The Convention defines some acts
of terrorism as:
act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any
other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.195

The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings deals
specifically with bombings.196 To define bombings that fall under the Convention, it
states:
[a]ny person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if
that person unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or
detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of
public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system
or an infrastructure facility: (a) With the intent to cause death or serious
bodily injury, or (b) With the intent to cause extensive destruction of such
a place, facility or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to
result in major economic loss.197
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The United Nations Security Council has consistently issued resolutions
condemning terrorism, and recognizing the need for the nations of the world to work
together to combat terrorism.198 These discrepancies in an exact definition of Terrorism
has led the United Nations to seek a uniform, worldwide definition of Terrorism.
The General Assembly of the United Nations is currently seeking to form a
Convention on International Terrorism which would include a definition of terrorism.
During discussions regarding the Convention, some parties expressed the position that
there is a “need to distinguish between terrorism and the legitimate fight of peoples for
their right to self-determination.”199 The same individuals are seeking a uniform
definition of terrorism for the entire International community.200
The Draft Convention on International Terrorism is still under negotiation.201
There is debate over the text of the definition of terrorism, which is currently:
The act of terrorism, or offense, is defined as a person’s unlawfully and
intentionally causing or threatening to cause violence by means of
firearms, weapons, explosives, any lethal devices or dangerous substances,
which results, or is likely to result, in death or serious bodily injury to a
198
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person, a group of persons or serious damage to property—whether for
public use, a State or Government facility, a public transportation system
or an infrastructure facility. Acts of terrorism also include such person’s
attempt to commit such an offense, participate as an accomplice in the
commission of such an offense, or in organizing or directing others to
commit such an offense, or in contributing to the commission of such an
offense.202
The Draft Convention also lists several treaties which are already in effect,
under which the violations of those treaties would constitute terrorism under the
Convention on International Terrorism.203 Among these treaties are those dealing
with seizure of aircraft, hostages and terrorist bombings.204

3. Customary International Law and Terrorism During Armed Conflict
The customs of war have led to the general belief that there are limits to the
methods and devices used in times of war.205 General humanity believes that
“incorporated into the customary law of war has been that human expectation
incorporated into the customary law of war has been that even in times of armed conflict,
people expect that each party to the conflict will conduct its operations in conformity
with the laws and customs of war.”206
There are two policy considerations behind making terrorism unlawful even
during war times. They are “the need for limiting the types of permissible participants
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and strategies in the process of armed violence,”207 and “a shared awareness of the need
to prohibit the deliberate terrorization of populations, both to preserve any ‘vestige of the
claim that war can be regulated at all’ and to save from extinction the ‘human rights’
limitations on the exercised of armed coercion within the social process.”208

4. State-Sponsored Terrorism
Not all terrorism is sponsored by guerrilla groups, which are often directly related
to terrorism. Rather, in some instances, terrorism can be sponsored by states themselves,
even upon their own people.209

5. Reliance on Defenses to Terrorism During War
As has been seen, the current understanding of the definition of Terrorism is
broad, and can encompass many of the other war crimes which can also be charged to the
accused. This section will address whether or not a defendant can rely on traditional
defenses to International Humanitarian Law defenses when charged with Terrorism.
When terrorism occurs during wartime, rights are established by the laws of
war.210 Among these rights are the ability to justify actions based on traditional defenses
of war crimes.211
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Under the “combatant’s privilege,” “combatants are immune from prosecution for
common crimes.”212 Under this privilege, terrorists during times of war could not be
prosecuted for common crimes such as homicide or the lawful taking of prisoners.213 In
addition, an attack on any legitimate target of war, such as government buildings, would
not result in a prosecution.214 Although direct attacks on the civilian population can still
be prosecuted, an amount of collateral damage would be tolerated when the actual target
is a legitimate wartime target.215
It is legitimate to take prisoners of war during armed conflict. “[K]idnapping a
combatant constitutes a lawful taking of prisoners. Consequently, taking military or
government personnel hostage would generally not constitute a crime.”216 Outside of
war, the taking of hostages as an isolated act is considered terrorism, and is not a proper
act.
During times of war, any individual that engages in acts that could be considered
terrorism that is captured would be given prisoner of war status.217 This status would
give the individual special rights that are not normally given to prisoners.218 Among the
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special protections are “humane treatment,” “respect for their persons and their honour,”
and “equal treatment.”219
Finally, wartime terrorists can rely on the obedience to orders defense.220 This
would give any terrorist who takes orders from someone ranked above them the ability to
invoke the defense that they were not acting on their own.221 “[I]t will render it more
difficult to obtain a conviction of accused terrorists.”222
Actions during wartime are all held to the standards of the laws of war.223 For
every action that occurs within the armed conflict, these defenses could be invoked by the
defense. If the actions occur outside of the area of conflict, the question to be asked is
whether or not the action occurred during wartime. If the terrorist act is determined to
have occurred within the war, then the defenses of war are to be applied. However, if the
action is determined to not have occurred during time of war, but rather in an area
currently enjoying a time of peace, then these defenses would not be able to be invoked
by the terrorist defendant.224

6. Cases on Terrorism
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In the context of terrorism during war, many of the crimes that we classify as war
crimes constitute “Terrorism.” It is worthwhile to address several cases that outline the
past findings of courts in respect to terrorism actions during times of war.

a. The Leipzig Trials
Under the Treaty of Versailles after World War I, the Germans recognized the
rights that the Allies possessed giving them the power to try those accused of violating
the laws and customs of war.225 The cases were tried before the Supreme Court of
Leipzig, which was the highest court in Germany.226
Karl Neumann was a commander of the U-67 who torpedoed a British hospital
ship without warning.227 He ordered the attacks on the grounds of the belief that hospital
ships were carrying combat troops.228 When he appeared in court, his defense centered
on the fact that he was following the orders of superiors, and he was acquitted of all
charges.229
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b. World War II Trials
Perhaps the most well known war crimes trials in history were the trials under the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The Nuremberg Tribunals were developed
as a means to hold trials for the atrocities that were committed by the Nazis during World
War II.230 It was agreed upon by the three major war powers of the time, the United
States, the USSR, and Britain.231 Following the war, about 200 defendants were tried at
Nuremberg, and about 1600 others were tried in other channels of justice.232
The first of the trials at Nuremberg was the Trial of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal233 (IMT). At that trial, 24 Nazi leaders were
tried for various war crimes.234 The indictments were for Conspiracy to commit crimes
against peace, Planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression, War crimes, and
Crimes against humanity.235
Out of the Nuremberg Trials came the Nuremberg Principles, which outlined what
can and cannot be done in times of war.236 Two of the crimes that are determined to be a
crime under International Law under the Nuremberg Principles can qualify as terrorism in
that innocent people such as civilians are the target of such crimes.
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The first of these is the general crime of War Crimes. Under the Nuremberg
Principles, War Crimes are defined as:

[v]iolations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are
not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation of slave labour
or for any other purpose of the civilian population of or in
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
persons of the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity.237
The second of the crimes that can qualify as terrorism during war are
Crimes against Humanity. Crimes against Humanity under the Nuremberg
Principles is defined as: “[m]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and
other inhumane acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on
political, racial, or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such
persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime
against peace or any war crime.”238
The crime against humanity which involved holding civilians in
concentration camps, and eventually killing many of them was addressed in the
trial. The court wrote, “there is no doubt whatever that political opponents were
murdered in Germany before the war, and that many of them were kept in
concentration camps in circumstances of great horror and cruelty.”239
The court continued, “[t]he policy of terror was certainly carried out on a
vast scale, and in many cases was organized and systematic. The policy of
237
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persecution, repression and murder of civilians in Germany before the war of
1939, who were likely to be hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly
carried out.”240

c. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Cases
Following an attempt at Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia, an ad hoc tribunal was
established to prosecute those who were involved with the atrocities.241 This was one of
the first tribunals that made “serious violations of the laws of war…apply to internal
armed conflicts…subject to international criminal sanctions as well.”242 In particular, the
tribunal focuses on the “indiscriminate bombardment of civilian populations and mass
rape…[since] Bosnia was notorious for both crimes.”243
There is no charge of Terrorism in any of the ICTY indictments, however, by
examining some of the atrocities, many of the indicted and convicted can be classified as
terrorists. For example, Dusan Tadic was charged with “intensive shelling of Muslim
areas in the Opstina Prijedor [causing] the Muslim residents to flee their homes.”244
These Muslim residents were civilians who were not part of the conflict.
In another indictment, several men were accused of “extermination of a
significant number of Bosnian Muslim civilians, including women, children and the
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elderly.”245 The cases of atrocities against the civilian population were numerous.
Although these situations were not exclusively defined in the allegations as terrorism,
they would fall under that category under most of the definitions of terrorism.

IV.

Conclusion
In all instances of armed conflict, the parties involved have a responsibility to

follow and adhere to the International rules regarding war and war crimes. Many of the
crimes which are determined to be crimes are those which help to keep the civilian
population as far from the battlefield as possible as they are innocent.
Collective punishment and terrorism are two of those such crimes. Collective
punishment forces parties involved in a dispute to refrain from randomly inflicting harm
against a population of innocent people, as well as to ensure that all people who are
accused of a crime have a proper trial for their alleged crimes. Terrorism also ensures
that the civilian population is not brought into the battle for actions that they did not do.
It ensures that even in a time of war, basic human needs are fulfilled, and citizens around
an area inflicted with the atrocities of war are given the opportunity to live in a situation
where they do not have to fear random attacks and their possible death every day.
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